In many cases, web application security cannot provide the required level of security. Proactive collection of network data from all of the network layers in real time and their forensic analysis can help to uncover information about the internal or external attacks and to prevent potential damages. The best way is to combine application and system monitoring and perform centralized traffic monitoring to correlate events. The data collected in such manner can be used to detect traffic anomalies and improve network intrusion detection. Tracing traffic at multiple levels could potentially provide more information about the intrusion features. Analysis of these centralized log data has become an important research area in proactive network security. Any attacks should be detected as soon as possible by monitoring system, to take appropriate corrective measures in timely manner. In this paper deferent types of network events and data sources are described and their integration into centralized log management infrastructure in proactive forensic architecture is researched. The authors of this paper proposed an integrated proactive digital forensic (IPDF) model for internal and external attacks and its contribution to overall network security in context of high -volume network traffic, big data and virtualized cloud computing environment.
INTRODUCTION
Proactive network forensics is becoming unavoidable in network information security. Two major changes have caused its development. e rst, costs of high-volume date storage on a network device are a ordable [Related Work In the eld of DF examination of big (high volume) data [28] , there are a few authors' works. e authors in [29] summarized some relevant works who contributed to the subjects such as big data digital forensic investigation, proactive digital forensic and forensic in virtualized environment. Roussev et al. (2004) proposed distributed digital forensics, tool for big data analysis, using Forensics Tool Kit (FTK), and increasing in performance from hours to a few minutes. Golden et al. (2005) presented an open source, high performance le carver, Scalpel that increased carving speed for factor of 4. Roussev et al. (2009) emphasized DF investigations on a cloud computing platform. Carrier et al. in [5] adapted the iterative z algorithm to speed up the process of imaging, searching and analyzing in DF, detecting outliers via MAC (modi ed, accessed, and created) times in set of spatial features in order to automate DF analysis and detect infected les. Phillip G. Bradford and Ning H. in their work [25] presented positional PDF architecture to discover insider attacks using monitoring system for following user's behavior in local network. e authors of this paper proposed an integrated PDF model (PDFI) for internal and external attacks and its contribution to overall network security in context of high -volume network tra c, big data and virtualized environment, such as cloud computing system.
OVERVIEW ON REACTIVE AND PROACTIVE DIGITAL FORENSICS
Digital forensics (DF) can be de ned as the set of methods, tools and techniques used to collect preserve and analyses digital data collected from any type of digital media, involved in an incident with the purpose of extracting valid evidence for the court of law. As a response to an incident or computer crime, DF investigation is essentially a reactive process and it is called reactive DF investigation (RDFI) (Fig.1.) 
Fig.1. Proactive and Reactive Digital Forensic Framework
Although RDFI or post-mortem forensics is very effective, it is limited, especially in anti-forensic incidents, volatile data and event reconstruction. To overcome this limitation, the Proactive Digital Forensic Investigation (PDFI) [25] is required. e PDFI processes should have the capacity to proactively collect and preserve data, detect suspicious events, analyze extracted evidence and report an incident as it occurs [15, 22, 25] . erefore, by being proactive, DF is prepared for incidents [16] . Although there is little work done on PDFI, it has many advantages over RDFI such as reducing the e ect of anti-forensic methods, providing more accurate and reliable digital evidence in real time, and saving time and money in carrying out DF investigation. e ve fundamental principles of computer forensics that could be applied for network RDFI and PDFI are presented in Table 1 [9] . analyze the cause and eff ects of events.
4
Understanding context and interpreti ng meaning of an event.
5 all acti ons and results must be done by forensic analyst.
Functional model of network proactive digital forensic investigation
ere are two type of network tra c monitoring systems [26, 12] : (1) Catch-it-as-you-can and (2) Stop-lookand-listen system. In the rst approach all packets passes through one determined tra c point where it is recorded and saved for later on analysis. is approach is not appropriate for PDA monitoring system, as it requires large amount of memory and batch type of analysis. In second approach each packet is analyzed in real time and only certain type of prede ned information are stored for later on analysis. e type of stored information could be suspicious and malicious data. is approach is appropriate for PDF monitoring system. However it requires much faster processor to respond incoming data tra c.
In case of PDFI the entire history of the system must be preserved and sometime the analysis and report the results should be perform in real-time. Proactive forensics depends on strong network monitoring system that makes main part of PDFI infrastructure. It must be designed to perform monitoring of internal user activities and to collect potential forensic evidence of the insider and outsider threats [6] . ere are few weaknesses in current NIDS based monitoring system such as: false positive and false negative, detection of non-critical events and low level and slow deviations [29] in user behavior. Most e ective proactive forensic system can be designed with NIDS and/or IPS devices as triggers for appropriate forensic tool. ese triggers should be forensically relevant data collected and generated by NIDPS in monitoring system. Depending on NIDPS model security vector usually has three states; suspicious, normal and anomalous [1, 18] . Collected data are aggregated into one of the three states. To select the relevant security features general access procedure can be used [29] . e results of PDF and monitoring system are presented in Fig.2 . An e ective monitoring system is needed for e ective and proactive incident management. In PDF system a permanent monitoring provides a real-time veri cation of the network security system. As the security layered infrastructure provides best protection of network information asset, most appropriate is a layered architecture of IDS in implementing PDF monitoring system. e authors in [1, 29] proposed typical NIDS design containing the three layers: top, middle and bottom. e model is proposed for network proactive protection from internal attacks.
Even though internal attacks are still prevailing, malicious programs and direct attacks over Internet can't be underestimated. e authors of this paper, using the idea from [29] , proposed the three layered IDS architecture for external and internal threats (Fig.3) . Tra c from the Internet is ltered in border rewall. Network IDS (NIDS) in this location registers attacks from Internet that braking through border rewalls. e NIDS registers attacks on the web, FTP, exchange and all other servers located in DMZ (perimeter network), too. It indicates problems with security policy, rewall con guration or its malfunctioning. e top layer of this model quickly registers malicious attacks from black-listed web sites and unauthorized internal user processes by malicious sites name and users' processes names. e middle layer utilizes a role based access control (RBAC) rule generated by the GA module to capture the internal unauthorized processes associated with particular user role. It is supposed that some malicious codes can pass through this layer. e bottom layer performs statistical analysis over the remaining users' processes for any "low-and-slow" deviations from the referenced process patterns associated with user and group of users' roles 29 . is layer can detect potential malware using signature and heuristic methods. Suspicious users' or malicious processes from the three layers are logged securely at a separate log storage providing input in o ine forensic tool. Forensic analyst, as a member of security team [30, 32] follow monitoring system alarms and security log storage on daily basis. Any misused or malicious process or code, discovered in forensic analysis process, automatically is sent to update black list of known processes and known malicious websites.
Proactively collecting and categorizing network data
In Fig.3 information of network security mechanisms are used in security practice for data collection from network devices and monitoring system. Obviously rewalls, AV programs and security log les are used most o en. Many people use NIDPS systems, too. However, the most interesting issues on this chart is position of the server and client honey pots that they have used before but stopped due to additional workload involved in setting them up [User pro ling according to his/her most o en performed actions.
◆ Attacker pro ling according to activities performed to unauthorized access. ◆ Signature analysis or "typing signature" analysis is a complex stylometric problem and can't be fully reliable as unique factor for attacker's identi cation. ◆ Attack signature that uses e.g. attacker's favorite type of vulnerabilities to perform an attack such as: security hole, miscon guration, bu er over ow, SQL injection or cross-site scripting [13] . Due to continuous new smart attacks created almost every day, any IDS systems must be regularly updated.
Network forensic data location and sources
In PDF architecture design is necessary to know where forensically relevant data are located. e key sources of forensic evidences on network and Internet are well known (Table 2 ) [1] . Many external sources o er forensic evidence for an incident in forms of IPs and URLs addresses, malicious URLs addresses of DNS-a, type of malware, botnets or C&C servers and malicious scanning. In general, methods of data acquisition for incident identi cation are quite di erent in surveyed organization (Fig.4.) Forensically pertinent data are collected into log les started from border routers and rewalls, via web servers and all other network active devices. e types of collected data should be designed according to PDF system purpose -detection of internal, external or both threats [10, 31 and 32] . e sources of collected data are shown in Table 1 . as a non-networked storage connected to the server, it extends the server storage capability by attaching another computer that is solely dedicated to storage. It is extremely fast as it has no network structure to contend with, but suff er from not being able to share storage space with other servers except with its connected host.
Aspects of network collected data forensic analysis

1) Forensic analysis of time stamps
Correlating the time stamps from all network devices is the rst step taken in any network investigation. It is impossible to establish a baseline from which to compare data timestamps if timestamps are not synchronized [4] . Best way to synchronize all devices on a network is to use Network Time Protocol (NTP) and to keep all network components accurate within milliseconds of Coordinated Universal Time (UTC). is accuracy is necessary because network communication relies on accurate timestamps to function correctly. Challenges in correlating network events are numerous.
2) Logs lters and archivers analysis
So ware such as event log analyzers collects, analyzes, reports, and archives SysLog from networked Windows hosts and other networked active devices. ese applications generate reports helping in threats monitoring and network forensic analysis. e event analyzer so ware proactively reduces system downtime, helps system administrators and increases network performances as whole. Some relevant features of typical event log analyzers are centralized event log management, compliance reporting, security analysis, automatic alerting, etc. [19] . Major bene ts of an event log analyzer are shown in Table 4 [38]. ere were several design goals when implementing logging infrastructure to capture the log data from every device on the network at all times. Logging into one central place where all the information would converge is the best way to correlate events across multiple devices. Results of our system operation are presented in Fig.5 . (Registered attempt port scans detected by the Snort sensor). For this reason a common time source and log format are desirable. It needs to have integrity in case the logs were required for use as evidence. is demands well designed archiving processes and handling procedures. From a usability perspective the log data needs to be easily reported on and manipulated by common database tools. A nal requirement is to have the system immediately alert administrators whenever suspicious items appeared in the logs. SysLog is most feature-laden product in this arena [8, 31] and majority of features and functionality is on its native OS UNIX.
Configuring somme of the network devices logs
Before we begin con guring all the devices, a little planning should be done. We need to understand a little about how the SysLog protocol itself was structured, to be able to design an e cient plan for using it at our company. Each SysLog message includes a priority value which is made up of two parts. e value is expressed as facility severity, where facility is a type of category for the message and severity is its relative importance. Some of the facilities are assigned for static purposes and others are user de nable. e user de nable facilities are those that we need to consider.
When con guring our devices to use SysLog we o en have the option to determine which facility and sometimes which severity the device would use. is provided us with an opportunity to organize the incoming log data in a way that would make it easier to manipulate both in an immediate (e.g. live response) and an historical (e.g. forensic analysis) context. Con guring all of our devices according to this scheme lend itself to a number of applications. is approach allowed us to easily focus our attention on high-risk devices. ose messages coming from perimeter hosts could be isolated from the rest of the tra c ow for increased scrutiny. Some examples of this approach will be detailed later in the paper, but now will be examined how some speci c devices should be con gured.
For the strong monitoring system in PDF infrastructure a log server, as the core of the centralized log architecture, is the most important. It enables proactive security features and makes easier digital forensic analysis later on. is collection of data in the log server, documents and speci cations provide the rst response to the computer incident and make easier forensic analysis in case of computer crime [9] . e system operates in the following manner: SNORT generates alerts or noti cation and transferred it to Barnyard. Barnyard parses the received messages and store it in SNORT events database (BASE uses this database). Same message sends to local rsyslog on local IDS/IPS sensor, which is forwarded to rsyslog on central log server. Log Anlyzer provides easy browsing and analysis of real time network events and reporting services.
CONCLUSION
Deployment of proactive digital forensic (PDF) infrastructure seems to be inevitable in order to assure required level of network security in complex network environment. e rst step in implementing PDF into the network is to provide collecting pertinent security and forensic data from all active networked devices in real time. Most useful tool is layered IDS monitoring system for proactive detection and reaction to internal and external network attacks. e event log analyzer so ware is becoming most important tool for proactive forensic deployment into network security system. e next step in proactive forensic infrastructure deployment should be to standardize event logs from the entire active log devices and to collect them into centralized log server. is log server provides creation of a proactive security system and a proactive forensic architecture. It makes easier digital forensic analysis following computer incident or crime. e next step in proactive forensic infrastructure deployment should be to standardize event logs from the entire active log devices and to collect them into centralized log server. is log server provides creation of a proactive security system and a proactive forensic architecture. e collection of data, documents and speci cations of the key components such as the data dictionary, syntax speci cations, and event taxonomies provide the rst response to computer incident [10] . It makes easier digital forensic analysis following computer incident or crime [8] .
In this paper authors proposed the theoretical functional models of the strong monitoring and PDF systems for real -time response to both internal and external attacks.
